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Cyber-security research in the field of smart grids is often performed with a focus on either the
power and control domain or the Information and Communications Technology (ICT) domain. The
characteristics of the power equipment or ICT domain are commonly not collectively considered.
This work provides an analysis of the physical effects of cyber-attacks on microgrids – a smart grid
construct that allows continued power supply when disconnected from a main grid. Different types
of microgrid operations are explained (connected, islanded and synchronous-islanding) and potential
cyber-attacks and their physical effects are analyzed. A testbed that is based on physical power and
ICT equipment is presented to validate the results in both the physical and ICT domain.
Testbed, Microgrid, Smart Grid, Cyber Security, Vulnerability, Synchronous Islanded Generation
1. INTRODUCTION
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA)
systems are widely used in industrial control systems
to collect information on the system state and issue
control commands to remote actuators. Incidents
like the attack on a German steel mill (Lee et al.
2014) show the ability of successful cyber-attacks to
cause physical damage. A close relationship between
Information and Communication Technologies (ICT)
and the physical domain needs to be established to
effectively counter these attacks. Models of Intrusion
Detection Systems (IDS) can be enhanced with the
constraints of the physical system. The same holds
for control loops in the physical domain which can
benefit from knowledge about the state of the ICT
domain. Current research on SCADA system security
is often based on an analysis of ICT protocols or
network layouts, and is therefore strongly biased
by cyber-security research in the ICT domain. The
benefits that come from an understanding of the
physical system that is under control are often
ignored: Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) as well as
mitigation strategies for Industrial Control Systems
(ICS) can leverage the laws of physics; they should be
developed based on concrete domains and use cases to
bridge the gap between the ICT and physical domains
more effectively.
The development of current power grids into a
smart grid revolves around a change from a
centralized, uni-directional communication and power
transmission layout, towards a meshed infrastructure
as highlighted by Farhangi (2010). Considine et al.
(2012) motivates a dynamic grid structure that is
based on interconnected microgrids. This allows for
an effective integration of renewable energy sources,
but introduces new requirements for the tighter
integration of ICT resources. Microgrids can be
operated in two ways: (i) connected to the main
grid, they can draw or supply power from it; and
(ii) islanded – disconnected from the main grid –
they supply local loads with local generation. Often,
islanded operation is only possible for a limited
amount of time. This calls for the capability to
dynamically connect and disconnect power islands
from the main grid; a transitional state that is highly
dependent on ICT infrastructure while the grid is
vulnerable to physical equipment damage due to
power dynamics.
This paper presents a cyber-security analysis of the
operational modes of microgrids. Special focus is
given to synchronous-islanded operation: a mode of
operation that controls the critical transitional state.
Required for this operation are Phasor Measurement
Units (PMUs), which are devices that allow the
c© The Authors. Published by BISL. 1
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measurement and communication of power dynamics.
Currently, PMUs are primarily used as recording
devices for post-fault analysis, but they have
received increased attention for security and control
applications. Our cyber-security analysis is based on
a physical testbed that is designed to represent an
islanded microgrid, which can be operated in an
islanded, synchronous-islanded or connected (to the
main grid) fashion. The main findings of this analysis
are that attacks on the integrity of measurement
and control communication can cause the most
severe physical impact on microgrids. While attacks
against communication availability require less attack
capabilities, they can only cause critical physical
effects under specific conditions out of the attacker’s
control. Attacks on confidentiality can cause no
direct physical impact but can be used during the
reconnaissance phase of an attack. Synchronous-
islanded operation is most vulnerable to physical
damage – even direct equipment damage – caused by
cyber-attacks.
2. PRELIMINARIES
Dynamic connection and disconnection of microgrids
is important for future smart grid operation. Power
dynamics need to be controlled to prevent equipment
damage and to ensure human safety. This section
gives an overview of the challenges involved with
synchronous-islanded operation of microgrids and
what it can be used for.
2.1. Synchronous-Islanded Operation
For most types of microgrids, independent operation
is only possible for a limited amount of time.
To prevent blackouts in the microgrid during
reconnection, it has to be possible for microgrids to be
dynamically added and removed from the main grid
during operation. Synchronous-islanded operation of
microgrids is seen as one way to tackle this challenge.
Even in islanding mode, the power metrics – voltage
magnitudes (Xm), frequency (ω) and phase angle
(φ) – are kept synchronized with the main grid.
When these power metrics are matched between the
islanded microgrid and the main grid, circuit breaker
re-closure (see Sect. 2.2) is safe.
Microgrid internal controls can also take over
completely when the main grid experiences severe
stability problems. Military microgrids are an
example where unstable environments are common
and this feature is required. If synchronization is not
guaranteed, re-closure of circuit breakers has to be
prohibited.
Synchronous-islanded operation enforces strict trans-
mission delay constraints on the underlying commu-
nication network. Control logic is used to control the
difference in frequency between the systems taking
the current phase angle difference into account. A
detailed controller example is given in Sect. 3.
2.2. Circuit Breaker Re-closure
Connection of two independent and running power
systems involves a set of risks, including out-of-sync
closure. Two independent systems run potentially
with different frequency and shifted phase angle.
At the moment of connection three variables in
the two systems have to be matched as closely as
possible. These are the voltage magnitude (Xm), the
frequency (ω) and the phase angle (φ). Limitations
on the acceptable difference between the systems
depend on the equipment in use. At the moment of
connection the two systems are forced to synchronize.
Depending on the synchronization quality at the time
of connection, this might cause a strong immediate
power flow on the circuit breaker. During this process
also generator equipment is affected. The two phase
angles are immediately forced to align, causing
critical physical stress on equipment like generators.
2.3. The Phasor
A phasor – first described by Charles Proteus
Steinmetz – is defined by the C37.118 standard (IEEE
Power & Energy Society 2011) as a representation of
the sinusoidal waveform defined in Eq. 1 with Xm
describing the amplitude of the wave, ω the angular
frequency and φ the phase angle of the waveform at
time t = 0.
x(t) = Xm cos(ωt+ φ) (1)
Using the transformation shown in Eq. 2 the phasor
can use the representation of an imaginary number
where the subscripts r and i signify real and
imaginary part respectively.
X = (Xm/
√
2)ejφ
= (Xm/
√
2)(cosφ+ j sinφ)
= Xr + jXi
(2)
Phasors are commonly used in AC power analytics.
The optimal assumption is a waveform with a
constant frequency of 50 Hz and a voltage amplitude
of 230 V for most of Europe and Asia. In this model,
the waveform x(t) is sufficiently defined by one phasor
at time t = 0 for any future time t. Real power
systems cannot fulfill this optimal model. Standards
define the acceptable ranges of power quality for
frequency and voltage. By allowing the frequency to
change, the phase angle φ measured at time t = 0
is not sufficient to define the waveform at time t1
2
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Figure 1: Graphical description of phasor definition.
(given ω and Xm at time t1 are known). Successive
measurements are needed to update the knowledge
about the waveform.
Figure 1 shows a graphical interpretation of a phasor
as a rotating vector. The magnitude Xm of the vector
equals the amplitude of the waveform. The frequency
ω describes the speed the vector rotates in. The phase
angle φ is the angle between the vector and the base
line. It becomes immediately clear, that the only
parameter really depending on the time t is φ. We
get the waveform by moving the source of the vector
along the x-axis (in this case time) with constant
speed. The projection of the vector on the y-axis is
then the value of x(t).
It has been possible to measure frequency and
amplitude for a long time, but more recently
Phasor Measurement Units (PMUs) have allowed
operators to measure the phase angle remotely. PMUs
allow the comparison of phasors of synchronous
systems by assuming a reference waveform of nominal
frequency. Phase Angle measurements are only
comparable when taken at the same time. Precision
requirements on time synchronization for comparable
phase angle measurements are given by the C37.118
standard (IEEE Power & Energy Society 2011) with
±3µs. These measurements enable a set of new
control capabilities but also open up new attack
vectors as we will discuss in Sect. 4.
3. SYNCHONOUS-ISLANDING TESTBED
This section describes the current implementation
of the synchronous islanding testbed at Queen’s
University Belfast. Section 3.1 gives an overview
of the current testbed architecture. It highlights
the physical components and describes their role
in the testbed. Section 3.2 describes the controller
functionality in more detail followed by a description
of the used communication protocol in Sect. 3.3.
3.1. Architecture
Figure 2 gives an overview of the testbed’s current
implementation. It is designed to operate a DC
machine synchronous with the main grid while in
islanded mode.
DC Machine. The DC machine is a DC Motor /
Alternator set. The DC motor is supplied from a
‘Eurotherm 590+’ digital DC drive; it offers analogue
inputs to control the set points on the drive. The
alternator is a 1000 rpm, 6 pole construction rated
for 5kVA with a 0.8 power factor. Socket terminals
on the laboratory work bench offer connection to the
three phases, their neutrals and the alternator field
winding over 4mm ‘banana’ plugs.
Phasor Measurement Units (PMUs). As PMU
technology, equipment from the OpenPMU project
(see Sect. 5) is used. PMUs are deployed at the main
grid and within the power island. The collected power
metrics are then transmitted to the controller.
Load Bank. A 3-phase resistive load bank is de-
ployed within the power island. It can be used to
evaluate the behaviour of the controlled island under
shifting loads.
Controller. The controller collects the measure-
ments from the PMUs and adapts the set points
of the generator set. The controller in the testbed
is implemented by a Python script running on a
Raspberry Pi. The Serial Peripheral Interface (SPI)
is used in combination with a transducer to transmit
the set points to the analogue input of the digital DC
drive. Figure 3 gives a schematic view on the modular
software architecture of the controller. Network pack-
ets are received and then handled by separate worker
threads to increase throughput. The worker thread
logic decodes the network packet and is therefore pro-
tocol dependent. The decoded measurement points
are then synchronized between the worker threads
and measurements from the two PMUs are matched
in the time domain. Once two measurements with
the same timestamp are received, phase angle and
frequency are extracted and sent to the controller.
The controller block implements the logic described in
Sect. 3.2. A generic Proportional-Integral-Derivative
(PID) controller is used in combination with some
additional logic to calculate the error value. The
calculated update value is then transferred to a gener-
ator set specific communication module. It calculates
an adequate set of set points as feedback for the
internal controller of the generator set.
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Figure 2: Overview on the testbed architecture. A DC Machine is operated synchronous with the main grid while in islanding
mode. A PMU at a remote, secure location in the main grid communicates with a local controller. A second PMU measures
the power metrics in the island. The controller compares the measurements from the two PMUs and controls the generator.
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Figure 3: Schematic view on modular controller software
architecture
3.2. Controller Strategy
A PID controller is a feedback-based control loop
mechanism. It relies solely on the measured variables
Controlled Process+
- 
  deKI I )(
dt
tde
DKD
)(
)(teKP P
)( te
+
+
+ )(tu )(ty)( tr
Figure 4: Standard model of a PID controller.
of the process under control and not on knowledge
about the underlying processes. This makes the
mechanism widely applicable without the need for
adaptation. Figure 4 gives an overview of the general
functionality of a PID controller.
The controlled process continuously emits measured
process variables (y(t)). The PID controller tries
to minimize the error (e(t)) between the process
variables and given reference set points (r(t)). While
y(t) is measured on the running process that is
controlled, r(t) is controlled by the operator; both
can change over time. An update signal (u(t)) is
transmitted by the controller to the process to update
the operation with the goal to minimize e(t). The
update signal comprises three weighted terms – the
proportional term P depends on the current error,
the integral term I depends on past errors and the
derivative term D predicts future errors. The weights
of each term (KP ,KI ,KD) are used to tune the
controller to a specific process.
For synchronous-islanded operation, two process
values need to be controlled: phase φ and frequency
ω. The internal controller in the generator set only
accepts one feedback signal. Figure 5 shows the
adaption of a general PID controller to the use case.
The analogue set point at the generator is used to
control the frequency. The classical PID control loop
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Figure 5: The control logic for synchronous islanded generation.
uses the current frequency of the power island (ωg) as
a feedback parameter and calculates the error given
the controller’s set point. The reference value for the
frequency (ωr) is received from the main grid. But it
cannot be used as is. A Phase Difference Control Loop
first calculates the error between the feedback phase
angle in the island and the phase angle reference (see
Eq. 3).
∆φ = φr − φg (3)
The Phase Difference Control Loop introduces a new
tuning parameter Kφ that weighs the phase angle
error. The weighted phase angle error is then added
to ωr to adapt the reference. As a result, the island
will intentionally run with lower frequency than the
main grid if its phase angle is ahead (the weighted
phase angle error will be negative) and with higher
frequency if the phase angle is behind. The complete
calculation of the set-point for the PID controller ∆ω
is shown in Eq. 4.
∆ω = Kφ∆φ+ ωr − ωg (4)
A known problem with PID controllers is integral
windup. A large change in set-points can cause
the integral part to accumulate a large error. This
error causes the feedback to overshoot; the update
from the controller further increases although the
proportional error was already resolved and now
points in the opposite direction. To resolve the issue,
the accumulation in the integral term is blocked,
while the update value from the controller is at the
limits.
3.3. Protocol
The OpenPMU currently supports transmission
of measurement values using the User Datagram
Protocol (UDP) over the Internet Protocol (IP).
Packets are transmitted to a statically defined IP
address with a sampling rate of 10 measurements per
second. UDP is a suitable transport layer protocol.
Randomly dropped packets are obsolete by the time
they would have been detected and requested again.
The payload of the packets contains
text-based comma-separated values in
the form of: $<PMU ID>,<Time in
UTC>,<Voltage>,<Frequency>,<Phase>*. This
protocol is sufficient for the basic usage of PMUs and
to operate a synchronous-islanded generator. This
protocol is sufficient for the basic usage of PMUs
and to operate a synchronous-islanded generator.
Even though traditional industrial protocols like
C37.118 do not offer more in terms of security, the
lack of message integrity and message confidentiality
limits the suitability of the protocol for security
research. It has to be noted that a wide range of
standardized protocols (like C37.118) do not offer
more in terms of security. Only IEC 61850-90-5
comes with specifications of signature-based message
integrity specified as part of the standard. While it
is possible that integrity protection features receive
more attention as PMUs are increasingly used
for control tasks, standards leave vendors a lot of
freedom when it comes to concrete implementations.
Often security features are in place, but checks are
disabled for simplicity or usability reasons. Thus,
the potential impact of cyber-attacks that can
circumvent integrity protection features remains
relevant.
4. CYBER-SECURITY ANALYSIS
This section provides a detailed cyber-security
analysis of different operation modes of microgrids
using PMUs for active control. Figure 6 shows an
extended version of the testbed, including (i) a bump-
in-the-wire solution for IEC61850-90-5 support and
(ii) a virtual office and SCADA network to allow
multi-stage attacks.
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Figure 6: Planned testbed layout including (i) a bump-in-the-wire solution for IEC61850-90-5 support and (ii) a virtual
office and SCADA network to allow multi-stage attacks in addition to the testbed presented in Fig. 2
The microgrid can be operated in three different
modes. Connected to the main grid, Islanded from
the main grid or In Transition between those two.
Synchronous-islanded operation will be the use case
for the transitional state as described in Sect. 2.
Attacks can aim to compromise one of three security
objectives: Availability, Integrity or Confidentiality.
In the following, we focus on attacks on the
communication infrastructure. Possible cyber-attacks
to devices and physical attacks to the system are out
of scope of this work. We give a general overview of
the limitations given by current power control setups,
describe attack types grouped by the three security
objectives and analyze possible physical effects of
each attack type in each of the operation modes. The
analysis is supported with related work in Sect. 5.
4.1. Power Grid Operation
The physical prerequisites and the current state-
of-the-art in power system control impose a set of
limitations on potential cyber-attackers. Inflicting
physical damage to power equipment by means
of cyber-attacks is difficult. Each input parameter
for power equipment is checked by an internal
control algorithm against a range of acceptable
values. This range assures safe operation of the
device to prevent physical damage. Protective
devices throughout the grid continuously check for
unacceptable conditions and automatically isolate
electrical faults. This does not prevent an attacker
from achieving an unacceptable condition in the grid,
but limits possibilities to propagate the fault. Further,
protective relays are hard-wired to the power lines
and, as such, cannot be attacked from the cyber
domain. Governments standardize the metrics for
power quality; namely the intended frequency and
voltage levels in the grid, including acceptable ranges
of deviation (230V ± 10% for voltage at any time
and 50Hz ± 10mHz for the average frequency over
a period of one day for Central Europe). Setpoints
for frequency and voltage can again be limited to
these acceptable ranges, in order to prevent accidental
or malicious power quality violations. Cyber-attacks
in the power domain can require detailed knowledge
about the system under attack and the possibilities
to inflict physical damage to power equipment are
limited.
For microgrids three operational modes are identified
that have further implications on the possibilities of
cyber-attacks.
Connected Mode. A microgrid is operated con-
nected to the main grid. Manual synchronization
of phase and frequency are not needed. To manage
the voltage on the distribution lines – to prevent
over- or undervoltage situations – the main grid can
control the active and reactive power that is fed into
the distribution system by the microgrid. This is
controlled by changing the set-points for active and
reactive power, which are the commands that can be
manipulated by an attacker in this stage.
Islanded Mode. The microgrid operates discon-
nected from the main grid. Local loads are supplied
by local generation. Synchronization with the main
grid is not needed. An internal controller has to
take responsibility for the power quality within the
microgrid. It has to ensure that the voltage and
frequency levels in the microgrid fulfill the power
quality requirements. These are fixed standardized
references and as such not possible to attack from the
cyber domain. Availability and integrity attacks are
possible on data from local measurement devices that
6
A Cyber-Physical Security Analysis of Synchronous-Islanded Microgrid Operation
Friedberg • Laverty • McLaughlin • Smith
are sent to the controller. In case the local demand in
a islanded microgrid exceeds the possible local gener-
ation, three possibilities exist: (i) the microgrid can
gracefully shut down, resulting in a local blackout;
(ii) load can be shed to maintain stable operation; or
(iii) the microgrid can attempt to reconnect to the
main grid.
Transitional State. Disconnection and reconnec-
tion are the two most volatile states for a microgrid.
Before disconnecting it has to be ensured that the
local generation can supply the local demand to
prevent a blackout in the microgrid. During recon-
nection syncrhonous-islanded operation is one way
to align phasor and frequency in the main grid and
in the island. In this state, both, the reference from
the main grid as well as local measurements are
sent over ICT networks and are, as such, open to
attacks. In particular, reference measurements from
the main grid have to potentially perform multiple
hops to reach the local controller, each of which is
a potential attack vector. Additional risk is imposed
at this stage by measurement data from the phasor.
For voltage and frequency, fixed power quality set-
points are known. A high deviation from these set-
points at the reference point in the main grid is
very unlikely and indicates faulty measurements or an
attack. For phasor measurement data, every potential
value is valid at certain points in time. It is the
deviation between the reference point and the local
measurements that has to be minimized.
4.2. Attack Types
The proposed use case contains two communication
links that can potentially be targeted by a cyber
attack: the ICT network and the GPS communication
used by the PMUs for clock synchronization. For
both, attacks on all three security requirements are
possible.
Availability. Communication in power systems
is often time critical. Control commands and
measurements are only valid for a given time window.
Therefore, Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks can either
aim to block traffic completely or delay a message
for long enough to shift the arrival time out of the
accepted time window. DoS attacks can happen on
different levels of the communication stack. On the
Physical Layer, wireless communication technologies
are vulnerable to cyber-attacks. In the given use
case, this can include both the ICT network and
the GPS signals. First, the communication between
the PMUs and the controller can include wireless
connections. This is especially true if the controlled
island is in a geographically isolated area. Second,
the PMUs rely on GPS for time synchronization. The
Data Link Layer is responsible for a reliable point-
to-point communication. In the proposed testbed,
communication between PMUs and the controller is
based on UDP/IP over Ethernet. With MAC address
spoofing, an attacker can masquerade as another
device. This is a potential threat to both availability
and integrity. On the Network and Transport Layer
resource exhaustion attacks can be especially effective
on power equipment, as resources are very limited.
These can also be performed on the Application
Layer, where computationally expensive requests can
be sent to devices.
Integrity. There are two main types of integrity
attacks: (i) existing messages can be intercepted
and altered or (ii) additional valid messages can be
injected into a communication flow. The first type
is also a potential threat to availability. Successful
integrity attacks are potentially more dangerous than
DoS attacks, because they can lead to unexpected
control decisions. Two different aspects of the system
need to be targeted. First, the integrity of a message
needs to be compromised. Then the message needs
to be manipulated in a way that results in the
intended effect in the controlled physical domain.
Integrity attacks are possible on GPS signals and on
the ICT network. On the ICT network, the following
measurements and control commands are at risk: in
connected mode the set-points for active and reactive
power, in islanded mode the local measurements of
frequency and voltage and in synchronous-islanding
mode all measurements at the reference point of
the main grid as well as local measurements of
phase, frequency and voltage. The potential effects
of integrity attacks on this information are further
discussed in Sect. 4.3.
Confidentiality. Attacks on confidentiality are the
least critical for power grid operation. But a lack
of message confidentiality can help attackers during
reconnaissance. The network layout, the type of
protocols in use, network addresses of potentially
vulnerable devices and the current status of the
power system are just a small sample of interesting
information that can be gathered on the network.
Availab. Integrity Confident.
Physical G# # #
Data Link G#  G#
Transport/
Network G# G# G#
Application G#   
Table 1: Overview of the attack capabilities required on
the different communication layers to target each security
objective. Full circles indicate, that an attack capability on
the specific layer is required, half circles indicate that an
attack on the layer is either sufficient but not required, or
can be used to extend the attack capabilities.
Table 1 shows the attack capabilities that are needed
on each network in order to perform a specific type of
attack. It can be seen that attacks on availability can
be performed on each network layer independently.
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They have a large attack surface. Integrity and
confidentiality attacks, on the other hand, have strict
requirements on the application layer. Especially on
the security features in place like signatures and
encryption.
4.3. Physical Effects
We have identified five types of physical impacts that
a cyber-attack can have in the described microgrid
use case. These include: (i) a local blackout in the
microgrid with no imminent threat to the rest of the
grid; (ii) instabilities on the main grid (these include
cases in which protective relays isolate electrical
faults); (iii) violations of the power quality in the
microgrid; (iv) physical damage to power equipment;
and (v) danger for human safety. Table 2 gives an
overview of the potential physical effects of cyber-
attacks in the different operation modes of the
microgrid. We differentiate three attack types: (i)
attacks on the availability and integrity of the GPS-
based clock synchronization of PMUs; (ii) attacks
on the availability of the ICT network; and (iii)
integrity attacks on the messages in the ICT network.
Attacks on availability and integrity of GPS are
categorized together because the physical effects
that can be caused are very similar. Only the
effectiveness of the attack can be higher if an integrity
attack is used to intelligently manipulate the time
synchronization, instead of introducing an arbitrary
error. Confidentiality attacks are not shown, as they
cannot directly introduce physical effects.
It is assumed that the attacker can only gain control
of the ICT network in the microgrid. Therefore,
attacks on all messages sent from and to the microgrid
by a central SCADA control center can be attacked.
Messages to other devices or substations in the main
grid cannot be affected. In the following, we will
discuss the table for each operation mode.
Connected. In connected mode the attacker’s
capabilities to cause physical damage are the
most limited. Measurements from the PMUs are
not required for safe operation. Only messages
controlling active and reactive power emission can
be affected. The potential impact of a manipulation
of these set-points depends on the significance of
the attacked microgrid’s size in comparison to the
main grid or a certain section in the distribution
network. Depending on the significance, blocking
or manipulating these set-points can cause local
grid instability and subsequently local blackouts.
Additional redundancies in the distribution network
can limit the possible damage. Further, protective
devices are in place to isolate electrical faults and
prevent propagation.
Islanded. In islanded mode, cyber-attacks cannot
influence the main grid. The microgrid, on the other
hand, is more vulnerable. One reason for this that is
specific to the proposed use case is that PMUs are
the only sensor in the proposed microgrid. Attacks
on the GPS signal have limited effect on the grid,
because control over frequency and voltage does not
require phasor orientation in islanded mode. The lack
of ICT communication as well as intelligent integrity
attacks on the other hand can cause serious physical
effects. By manipulating the local measurements of
frequency and voltage, control over power quality is
lost which can result in a violation of power quality
metrics as well as a shutdown of the microgrid.
Synchronous-Islanding. Synchronous-islanding is
the most volatile operation mode where the most
critical physical damage can be achieved: damage
to equipment and risk of human safety. The critical
moment for equipment is the moment of circuit
breaker re-closure. Significant differences of phase
angle, frequency or voltage magnitude between the
main grid and the island can damage the circuit
breaker as well as local synchronous generators.
This situation can be achieved by manipulating the
feedback loop in charge of synchronization. DoS
attacks on the ICT network can easily be detected
and re-closure can be prohibited. The effects of
limited precision in clock synchronization between
the PMUs is harder to detect and therefore more
critical. Most damage can be done using integrity
attacks on the ICT network. Manipulation of the local
measurements or measurements from the reference
point trick the controller into making incorrect
assumptions about the system state. This can be used
to maximize the phase angle difference. The local
controller has no way of verifying the correctness of
the data. It will assume synchronization is achieved
while the control decisions potentially led to a
maximization of the phase angle difference. While
frequency and voltage levels can be compared to the
static set-points from the power quality metrics, the
same cannot be done for phase angle information.
This leaves the controller vulnerable to integrity
attacks without the ability to detect them.
5. RELATED WORK
One approach for safe circuit-breaker re-closure is
synchronous-islanded operation of power islands;
a universally applicable method is presented by
Best et al. (2008). The authors describe general
requirements and possible limitations caused by time-
delay introduced when transmitting the reference
signal. Challenges like islanding detection and control
initiation are covered as well as issues with power
quality and security mechanisms in the case of a
communication loss. Laverty et al. (2008) performs
a detailed analysis on the effect of the time
delay introduced by wide-area telecommunications.
In their work, the authors show the response of
an alternator operated by an Internet-based phase
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Local
Blackout
Mains
Instability
Violation of
Power Quality
Equipment
Damage
Human
Danger
Connected
Avail. or Int. GPS # # # # #
Availability ICT # G# # # #
Integrity ICT G# G# # # #
Islanded
Avail. or Int. GPS G# # # # #
Availability ICT  # # # #
Integrity ICT  #  # #
Sync-Islanded
Avail. or Int. GPS  # # G# G#
Availability ICT G# # G# # #
Integrity ICT  #    
Table 2: Overview on physical effects of different types of cyber attacks in the three operation modes of a microgrid. Half
circles indicate that control algorithms without knowledge of the ICT system can potentially mitigate the physical effect.
Full circles indicate that additional control algorithms will be needed that bridge the gap between the physical and the cyber
domain to detect and mitigate the threat.
difference controller to local load acceptances. They
were able to show that control is effective when it is
operated on a telecommunication link with variable
time delay such as the Internet. Caldon et al. (2004)
evaluates the effects of synchronous and inverter-
interfaced generators on the stability of power islands.
The authors show, that inverter-interfaced generators
increase the stability of frequency and phase angle
difference. Synchronous-islanded operation highly
depends on Phasor Measurement Units (PMUs).
Research on the potential effects of cyber-attacks
on physical infrastructures in cyber-physical systems
is often performed from either an ICT or a
physical and control engineering perspective. In
the ICT domain, Dondossola et al. (2008) analyze
potential cyber-attacks on power substation control
systems. Their research focus lies on the potential
threats of cyber-attacks to the ICT communication
capabilities. Potential physical effects are highlighted
but no critical physical effects are achieved in
the experiments. Wang and Lu (2013) highlight
potential cyber-attacks on availability, integrity and
confidentiality, and their potential effects on different
use cases. They also present potential mitigation
strategies. Signatures and encryption are presented
as cryptographic countermeasures, and the difficulties
that arise from limited computing power and
strict time constraints are explained. Network-based
countermeasures are presented and grouped by the
targeted communication layers. Availability attacks
on GPS signals by GPS jamming are presented by
Hu and Wei (2009). The authors also elaborate on
countermeasures against GPS jamming in modern
GPS receivers. Zhang et al. (2013) presents an
integrity attack on GPS signals with respect to
time synchronization. The authors show how the
injection of targeted GPS signals increases the effect
of the attack in comparison to the arbitrary error
introduced by availability attacks. In the control
domain, work by Sandberg et al. (2010) and Dán
and Sandberg (2010) focuses on risks associated
with bad data injection – an attack against state
estimation where the monitored system state is
manipulated in order to remain undetected. The
authors develop security indices for nodes in the
grid that produce measurement data. These indices
are used to define how critical measurements from
a certain node are to the overall state estimation.
This knowledge can be used to introduce security
features step-by-step, starting with the most critical
nodes in the system. Kundur et al. (2011) presents
a first step towards a graph-based framework for
modeling the physical impact of cyber-attacks on
smart grids. Two case studies show the application
of the framework in a Matlab environment based
on two modified models of the IEEE 13 node
distribution system. One case study shows that a
successful cyber-attack can cause a severe under-
frequency situation that ultimately results in a local
blackout. Iowa State University (ISU) have developed
the PowerCyber testbed in 2013 (Hahn et al. 2013).
Real physical components are used to implement
substations. Substation communication is performed
using IEC 61850 GOOSE messages. The Internet-
Scale Event and Attack Generation Environment
(ISEAGE) project – also developed by ISU – is
used to emulate wide-area networks. SCADA-specific
hardware is used to emulate a control centre. The
physical setup is integrated with a real-time digital
simulator and a PowerFactory based oﬄine simulator
for bigger power grid instances. Of special interest
is the use of IEC 61850 as well as the scalable
approach of combining physical devices with power
grid simulation. The authors further perform an
analysis of the cyber and physical impact of cyber-
attacks on three use cases of the system. The first use
case shows the effect of a malicious breaker trip in a
three generator set. It is shown that isolation of one
generator can cause the remaining two synchronous
generators to become unsynchronized. The second use
case highlights the effects of DoS attacks on state
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estimation algorithms. The third use case presents a
coordinated multi-stage attack on a Remedial Action
Scheme (RAS) that could cause load-shedding, as well
as frequency instability.
6. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we have performed a cyber-security
analysis of different operational states of microgrids,
with a particular focus on synchronous-islanded
operation. To control these operational states, an
increased integration of power systems with ICT
communication is needed. Our analysis, which is
based on a testbed that includes both power
equipment and ICT components, has considered the
physical limitations imposed by real power equipment
and the potential capabilities of an attacker in the
cyber domain. We have indicated that a cyber-attack
can cause physical damage to power equipment and
endanger human safety. These findings motivate the
need for new solutions for cyber-physical resilience
in microgrids. These solutions need to tightly
integrate efforts from ICT and power domain to
detect and mitigate cyber-attacks accurately and
ensure safe operation. Future work will include
further development of the presented testbed. The
described attacks will be implemented and evaluated
in this cyber-physical environment. A more formal
security analysis will be conducted using the Systems
Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA) method, as
proposed by Levenson (2011). Our goal is the
realisation of a resilience framework that ensures the
safe operation of microgrids during cyber-attacks.
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